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ON THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM CHOICE 
OF LAW CODE 
Larry Kramer* 
At first blush, the notion of a uniform choice of law code seems 
almost paradoxical. After all, the primary mission of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is 
to promote uniformity in the law, while choice of law exists only be-
cause laws are not uniform. To be sure, the Constitution of the 
NCCUSL limits the organization's objective to promoting uniformity 
"where uniformity is desirable and practicable,"1 which leaves plenty 
of room for different laws and hence for choice of law. But even so, 
one would expect the Commissioners to devote their limited resources 
to reducing the conflicts that necessitate choice of law rather than to 
improving the choice of law process itself. 
Possibly for this reason, the National Conference has not spent 
much time on choice of law. It has, over the years, adopted a few 
measures dealing with particular conflicts problems,2 but choice of law 
as a field has largely been ignored. This essay argues that such indif-
ference is a mistake and that the NCCUSL should make a place on its 
agenda for comprehensive treatment of choice of law. Indeed, a uni-
form choice of law code promulgated under the auspices of the 
NCCUSL could be as important and useful in this field as the Com-
missioners' most notable achievement - the Uniform Commercial 
Code - was in the field of commercial relations. 
I. ON THE RELEVANCE OF CHOICE OF LAW 
Before turning to the argument for a uniform law, we should take 
a moment to consider why choice oflaw is worth the National Confer-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1980, Brown University; J.D. 
1984, University of Chicago. -Ed. I am grateful to Alex Aleinikoff, Lea Brilmayer, Herma Hill 
Kay, Rick Pildes, and Kent Syverud for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. HANDBOOK OF nm NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF nm ANNuAL CoNFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY·FIFI'H 
YEAR 463 (1990). 
2. E.g., UNIF. CoNFLICT OF LAWS - LIMITATIONS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 59 (1991 Supp.); UNIP. 
CHILD CuSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1991); UNIF. DIVORCE REcooNmoN ACT, 
9 U.L.A. 355 (1988); UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 
(1991). In addition, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Probate Code contain 
provisions dealing with choice of law problems. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103 (1991); UNIF. PRO-
BATE CoDE § 2-506 (1991). 
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ence's (or, for that matter, anyone's) attention. One reason is practi-
cal: conflicts problems arise in an enormous number of cases.3 These 
include many of today's most vexing litigation problems, such as lia-
bility for mass torts, responsibility for environmental cleanup, and 
(perhaps most important) insurance coverage for these two issues. Yet 
courts today are plainly confused about how to handle choice of law 
cases. 4 Thus, simple concern for effective litigation management 
makes choice of law worth examining. 
Choice of law is important for another reason as well. Consider 
Bill Miller's observation that in saga Iceland "law" referred not only 
to positive enactments but also to the community that lived by those 
enactments. 5 This rich meaning of law probably is not apparent to 
English speakers today, but the point nevertheless remains valid. Not 
that law is the only thing that establishes a community; many of the 
social conventions that foster a sense of membership and exclusion 
operate outside the direct influence of promulgated legal norms. But 
the positive enactments loosely included in today's conventional un-
derstanding of "law" are nonetheless an important part of the way a 
polity creates and asserts its self-identity. 
This, of course, is contrary to current academic fashion, which em-
phasizes the importance of ethnic identity and private power. 6 But 
even these concerns inevitably must ·be addressed within the frame-
work of a positive legal apparatus. Hence, debates about whether and 
how to preserve ethnic cultures or control private power invariably 
deal with the content of positive law. If individual empowerment is a 
goal of participatory democracy, one of the objectives is empowerment 
to enact laws of a particular type. 7 
In the United States; of course, we cannot talk about "the" positive 
law, as if there were only one. ·There are more than fifty positive laws, 
including federal law and the laws of the states and territories. More-
3. I am not aware of any statistics on the number of conflicts cases, but a LEXIS search for 
the phrases "choice of law," "conflict oflaws," or "conflicts of law" turned up 17,862 state and 
federal cases. This is not surprising given population centers that span state borders and the ease 
of interstate travel and communication. 
4. See Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Derelopments, 39 
AM. J. CoMP. L. (forthcoming 1991); cf. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 
34 MERCER L. REv. 521 (1983) (describing different approaches used in different states); Smith, 
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 1041 (1987) (same). 
5. Miller, Of Outlaws, Christians, Horsemeat, and Writing: Uniform Laws and Saga Iceland, 
89 MICH. L. REv. 2081, 2082 (1991). 
6. See, e.g., Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 91 
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Torres & Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: 
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625; West, Progressive and Conservative Constitution-
alism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1990). 
7. See Binder, What's Left?, 69 TExAs L. REv. (forthcoming 1991). 
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over, preserving this multiplicity of overlapping but independent sov-
ereign communities is one of the fundamental and enduring 
commitments of our constitutional order. 8 And this, in turn, entails a 
commitment to respect and preserve the separate laws through which 
each of these communities articulates its values and establishes its so-
cial order. Choice of law plays a critical role in this regard: by defin-
ing each sovereign's power to regulate vis-a-vis other sovereigns, it 
establishes the effective boundaries. 
To return to tenth-century Iceland, Miller posits that the Ice-
landers had to become all pagan or all Christian because they lacked a 
state to mediate disputes about where the old law left off and the new 
law began.9 But a decisionmaking body, even one with enforcement 
authority, also needs to draw lines in a way that adherents of both 
laws accept as fair and legitimate. This is where principles of choice of 
law become important. 
I do not want to overstate the importance of choice of law, which 
obviously is not the dominant issue in intergovernmental relations. 
But for most readers, I suspect the topic suggests only trivial matters: 
guest statutes, statutes of limitations, and the like. Such problems 
(which have concededly occupied too much of the time of conflicts 
scholars) are hardly ones on which a community's identity stands or 
falls - though we should acknowledge that these are in fact the 
problems that bring most people to the legal system. In any event, 
decisions about choice of law are not limited to car accidents and slip-
and-fall cases. Choice of law also concerns marriage, divorce, child 
custody, abortion, criminal law, welfare, education, and innumerable 
other matters of greater and lesser importance. Choice of law defines 
the scope of the whole corpus of a state's law, and in this way it defines 
the scope of the community itself. 
II. ON THE NEED FOR UNIFORM CHOICE OF LAW RULES 
It does not follow that because states need a choice of law system, 
all states need the same system. On the contrary, once we recognize 
that choice of law defines the limits of a state's law, looking for uni-
formity seems a bit unrealistic. Surely different states may legitimately 
have different desires and expectations about how far their laws should 
extend. That being so, why worry about uniformity? 
Once again, there is an easy answer based on practical considera-
8. This is a matter of more than symbolic importance, for while federal power has expanded 
enormously throughout the twentieth century, the vast majority of the law that affects most 
citizens remains state and local. 
9. Miller, supra note 5, at 2094. 
August 1991] Uniform Choice of Law Code 2137 
tions and a more complicated answer having to do with the nature of 
choice of law. The easy answer is that uniform treatment of choice of 
law helps the parties by assuring predictable outcomes. People seldom 
plan to end up in court, and usually do not know where they will 
litigate until hostilities commence.10 Consequently, if states employ 
different approaches to choice of law, the parties cannot know what 
law governs their conduct until after they have acted. The resulting 
uncertainty is unfair, and it discourages desirable interstate activity. 
Because this is bad for all states, all states should have an interest in 
devising a choice of law system that provides predictable, uniform 
treatment of multistate cases. 
This argument reflects one side of a longstanding dispute between 
advocates of choice of law rules and proponents of case-by-case analy-
sis of the policies at issue.11 Rules advocates emphasize the impor-
tance of consistency and uniformity and argue that these values are 
best achieved with a shared system of rules.12 Advocates of case-spe-
cific analysis counter that judges should be concerned primarily with 
implementing substantive policies and that this is best done by ap-
proaching each case on its own terms.13 
This dispute, in turn, is merely a particularized example of a larger 
legal debate about rules versus discretion. It is a debate that cannot be 
resolved in general terms or on the basis of deductive logic. Rather, 
the choice between rules and case-specific analysis (or an appropriate 
mix of the two) turns in any particular context on certain empirical 
and value judgments: How important is predictability in this area? 
Does case-by-case analysis identify substantively correct answers bet-
ter than rules we can-realistically formulate? How much better? Can 
we devise rules that are sufficiently clear and workable to provide real 
guidance? 
Judgments about these questions in choice of law have varied over 
the years. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common 
10. In some commercial contexts, the parties include choice of law or choice of forum 
clauses. This alternative is unavailable in nonconsensual transactions, however, and even in con-
tract cases it helps only if courts enforce the clauses - a choice of law question on which states 
differ. 
11. See Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. l, 7 n.15 (1989) (citing authorities). 
12. See. e.g., Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 173, 212-13 (1981); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach?, 51 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 315 (1972); Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 946 
(1981). 
13. See, e.g •• B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 170-71, 183-87 
(1963); M. HANCOCK, Three Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem: The Classificatory, the 
Functional and the Result-Selective. in STUDIES IN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW: TORTS, INSUR-
ANCE, LAND Tm.Es 1 (1984). 
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law courts developed a comprehensive system of rules for resolving 
conflicts problems. These rules were then attacked vigorously by aca-
demics during the first half of the twentieth century. Critics charged 
that the traditional rules were in fact very bad at identifying substan-
tively correct outcomes and (because they were easily manipulated) 
not much better at providing uniformity and predictability. But the 
attack went beyond calling for different and better rules. Instead, rea-
soning that rules are inherently inferior to case-by-case analysis at 
finding right answers, the reformers urged judges to worry less about 
predictability and more about substantive outcomes in particular 
cases.14 
Beginning with the 1963 decision in Babcock v. Jackson, 15 this cri-
tique swept through the courts, and judges in most states abandoned 
the traditional choice of law rules for a variety of more ad-hoc ap-
proaches. Within a remarkably short time, however, minds began 
changing again, as experience with case-by-case analysis led observers 
increasingly to appreciate the values of uniformity and predictability. 
Most commentators today recognize that while the traditional rules 
were far from perfect, they provided more consistency than their crit-
ics realized. There is, simultaneously, a general perception that 
choices made under case-specific approaches are seldom clear cut, 
leaving room to question whether the results really are substantively 
better. As a result, more and more commentators have begun advising 
courts to return to rules. 16 There is, however, little sentiment in favor 
of reinvigorating the traditional rules, which practically everyone 
agrees are overbroad and arbitrary. Instead, the revisionist view is 
that we should develop new rules to fill this gap.17 
As I suggested above, there is a second (and in my view better) 
reason for creating a uniform choice of law code - one having to do 
with the nature of choice of law. The premise of the first argument is 
that the benefit of rules in terms of predictability more than offsets 
14. For a more detailed recounting of these developments, see L. BRILMAYER, CoNPLicr OP 
LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FlmJRE DIRECTIONS 22-41 (1991). 
15. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). 
16. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 277, 320-21 (1990); Singer, 
supra note 11, at 27. Singer offers a valuable reminder that the lines drawn in this debate are less 
sharp than we like to pretend: rule-like patterns develop under ad-hoc analysis, flexible stan-
dards are employed in implementing rules, policy analysis is required to choose among rules, Id. 
at 6-23. But if the differences are less distinct than is commonly supposed, there are nevertheless 
differences. Moreover, experience in choice of law suggests that however narrow these differ-
ences ought theoretically to be, they are in fact quite large in practice. 
17. A notable exception is Professor Alfred Hill, who maintains that the common law choice 
of law rules generally do a good job of accommodating state interests with the need for workable 
rules. Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 1585 (1985). 
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their cost in terms of the occasional substantively incorrect answer. 
An underlying assumption - one made in virtually all debates about 
rules and discretion - is that case-specific analysis is superior at find-
ing the right answer in any particular case. Choice of law rules are 
supposedly justified only because this advantage is outweighed by the 
unpredictability of case-by-case analysis. I want to suggest, however, 
that choice of law rules may be essential not only to provide predict-
ability, but also to produce the best substantive outcomes. 
To understand why rules are necessary to achieve the best substan-
tive results in choice of law, we must first consider what we mean by a 
"right" answer in this context. When lawyers argue that one of two 
legal rules (or two interpretations of the satne rule) is "right," they are 
usually making one of two kinds of claims. On the one hand, an an-
swer may be right for process reasons, that is, because one rule (or one 
interpretation) comes from a more authoritative lawmaker: statutes 
are superior to common law, decisions of higher courts trump those of 
lower courts, decisions of later legislators are preferred to those of ear-
lier ones, and so on. Alternatively, an answer may be right for sub-
stance reasons, that is, because it is better as a matter of social or 
political justice: thus, one solution may allocate resources more effi-
ciently, move society toward a more equitable distribution of power, 
avoid morally irrelevant differences, or serve some other desirable 
goal. 
Defining the relationship between these two kinds of claims is not 
easy. In practice, "process-based" and "substance-based" arguments 
overlap and inform one another. To take an obvious example, if there 
is a dispute over how to read an ambiguous statute or judicial opinion, 
one's views about which reading is substantively better may inform the 
result without being expressly or even consciously identified as such. 
Be that as it may, arguments of each type are presented and debated as 
distinct ways of thinking about law. The still predominant legal pro-
cess model consists largely of an effort to minimize the role of substan-
tive argument in adjudication - reserving it for cases of genuine 
ambiguity or conflicting rules of equal authority. The most powerful 
challenges to that model, in the meantime, involve efforts to upgrade 
the status of arguments based on substantive justice. But while both 
approaches may be controversial (depending on whom one asks), both 
reflect a style of argument that judges and lawyers generally find 
familiar. 
A common feature of both legal process and substantive justice 
thinking is the assumption that there is a right answer in every case. 
The answer may not be obvious; it may not be demonstrable to a cer-
2140 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:2134 
tainty through the exercise of logical deduction. The parties may disa-
gree about whether it turns on procedural or substantive justifications, 
or about which procedural or substantive justifications are even legiti-
mate. But whatever particular premises one accepts, the general as-
sumption is that one of the available options is intrinsically "better" or 
"more right" in any particular case. Put another way, there is a no-
tion that through the application of some form of proper reasoning we 
can assign the options objective, relative priorities. 
This way of thinking about law has naturally made its way into 
choice of law. Like scholars in every other field, choice of law scholars 
assume that their task is to develop a theory of procedural or social 
justice that will identify the law that provides the best "conflicts jus-
tice" in each case.18 In my view, this whole way of thinking about the 
problem is misleading. The reason is this: in any true conflict, we 
have (at least) two competing versions of justice, each associated with 
a different sovereign. Because these sovereigns are, by definition, coe-
qual - because, that is, each is equally entitled to decide what is right 
for a particular case - we have no ground from which to judge one 
state's law better or more just. On the contrary, subordinating one 
state's law to the other's on such grounds is inconsistent with the 
premise of sovereign equality. 
It does not follow that each state should just go its own way. 19 It 
follows only that we cannot resolve such cases through conventional 
appeals to a procedurally more authoritative or substantively better 
law. We cannot, in other words, say that one state is a superior 
lawmaker (the way we say that a legislature is superior to a common 
law court within a single state) or that one state's solution is more just 
- for both these statements are inconsistent with the premise that 
18. There are choice of law approaches fitting both the substance-based and the process-
based models. The most well-known substance-based theory is Leflar's "choice-influencing con-
siderations," often called the "better law" approach. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966). Joe Singer offers a modernized and 
considerably more sophisticated version of "better law" analysis. Singer, supra note 11. The 
most well-known process-based approach is the Second Restatement, which purports to identify 
the more authoritative lawmaker in any given case (the state with the "most significant relation-
ship") based on a balancing of relevant factors and contacts. See Rl!srATEMBNT (SECOND) OP 
CoNFLicr OF LAWS§ 6 (1988). Aaron Twerski's "enlightened territorialism" is another exam· 
pie of a process-based approach. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Covers -
The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 373 (1971). 
19. This was Brainerd Currie's solution. B. CURRIE, supra note 13, at 117-21 (forum should 
apply its own law in true conflict because courts are not capable of choosing and so should fulfill 
their role as agents of the state's lawmakers). Note, however, that while this idea is most closely 
associated with Currie, it can be found in other places as well. The traditional rejection of the 
renvoi, for example, assumes that when states disagree about how to resolve a choice of law 
problem, the forum should follow its own solution. See Kramer, Return of the Renvol, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991). 
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each sovereign is equally entitled to make law. Instead, we must think 
about choice of law more like treaty negotiations, where the "correct-
ness" of a particular solution is simply a matter of what the states 
agree to do. 
To illustrate, imagine a simple multistate choice of law problem 
(the kind that I suggested above is already discussed too much in 
choice of law scholarship but that nonetheless is useful for these pur-
poses): P and D sign a contract in which D agrees to leave the bulk of 
her estate to P in exchange for certain services. P is from Illinois, 
which enforces contracts to make a will; D is from Michigan, which 
prohibits such contracts in order to protect the economic well-being of 
decedent's survivors. After P performs the required services, D in-
forms him that she will not alter her will. P sues, relying on Illinois 
contract law. D counters that Michigan law applies and that the con-
tract is therefore unenforceable (though P may recover in quantum 
meruit). 
The first question is whether the case presents a conflict at all. 
None of this stuff about reconciling the laws of coequal sovereigns 
matters unless both parties have a plausible argument for relying on 
the laws they cite. This much of the problem is similar to any wholly 
domestic case: the court must interpret each law separately and deter-
mine whether the party invoking it states a claim or defense on these 
particular facts.20 Here, P can reasonably argue that Illinois protects 
contractual expectations when the economic consequences of an agree-
ment are felt in Illinois, while D can just as reasonably argue that 
Michigan prohibits agreements to make a will that could deprive 
Michigan families of estate assets. Thus, while there are undoubtedly 
cases in which Illinois or Michigan law does not apply - for instance, 
where there are no economic consequences in Illinois or where the 
decedent has no connection to Michigan - this does not seem to be 
one of them. Both states would apply their laws here because the facts 
implicate the purposes of both states' laws. 
The case thus presents a real conflict, and we must find a way to 
choose one of the laws. We cannot make this choice by asking about 
the rights and interests of the parties, because their rights and interests 
are defined by law and we have two laws that define these rights differ-
20. The idea that deciding whether there is a conflict in multistate cases is similar to deciding 
whether a party states a claim in ordinary domestic cases is familiar to students of choice of law. 
Because I have explored this issue elsewhere and want to focus here on cases in which a real 
conflict exists, I will not discuss it further. Interested readers may see Kramer, More Notes on 
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CoRNELL INTL. L.J. 245 (1991) [hereinafter 
Kramer, More Notes]; Kramer, supra note 16, at 280.311; Kramer, supra note 19. 
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ently. We must find some other way to decide which state has a supe-
rior claim to define the parties' rights on these facts. 
Can we find an answer in the Constitution? Certainly not under 
present law. Constitutional restrictions on choice of law leave room 
for more than one law in a great many situations, including this one.21 
Basically, the Court has held that any state with a material domestic 
interest in the disposition of a case may apply its law.22 The reasons 
for this minimalist approach are easy to understand. It is one thing to 
draw a line between interested and disinterested states and say that a 
disinterested state ha8 no legislative jurisdiction. Quite apart from 
choice of law considerations, there is no reason to extend a state's sov-
ereignty to persons or disputes with which the state has no connection. 
Choosing among legitimately interested states, however, is another 
matter altogether. Uncertain about how to make such choices, and 
aware that the states themselves are hopelessly divided on the ques-
tion, the Court has hesitated to constitutionally mandate any particu-
lar choice of law system. 
Moreover, restraint makes sense for reasons other than reluctance 
to impose a particular choice of law scheme during a time of flux. 
How would the Court make such choices? As I noted above, the con-
ventional legal response is to appeal either to the superior authority of 
one of the lawmakers or to the substantive justice of one of the laws. 
Clearly the Court cannot choose on the ground that one state is a 
more authoritative lawmaker. The federal government is superior to 
the states, but the states are all equally authoritative. Interstate travel 
and communication may create overlaps in states' regulatory and 
other policies, but one state does not become less authoritative in legis-
lating just because another state is also interested. Real conflicts sim-
ply present a choice between two equally authoritative, but 
inconsistent legal rules. 
When faced with such conflicts in wholly domestic cases, courts 
generally turn to substantive considerations and choose the law that 
21. See E. ScoLES & P. HAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 3.20-3.30 (1984). 
22. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). But see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that 
forum may always apply its own statute of limitations, even where a claim is governed by the 
substantive law of a different state). The Constitution also imposes substantive constraints on 
state lawmakers. Thus, the hypothetical case in the text would be easy if one of the laws violated 
one of these provisions of the Constitution. Alternatively, the due process clause makes it uncon-
stitutional to apply even a substantively constitutional law under certain circumstances, such as 
where the disadvantaged party had no reason to expect this result. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For purposes of this discussion, I assume that such arguments are 
unavailable and that the case falls within the relatively large sphere of discretion the Constitution 
leaves to states. 
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reflects the better policy. That move is unavailable in the multistate 
context, however. Consider my hypothetical case: Illinois has deter-
mined that contracts to make a will are permissible and gives parties a 
right to protect their contractual expectations. Michigan apparently 
disagrees: its lawmakers have determined that it is "better" to protect 
survivors, even if this means upsetting an otherwise innocent party's 
expectations. Both states have a legitimate interest in the disposition 
of the case and are therefore equally entitled to assert legislative juris-
diction. Which state's law is "better"? Most commentators probably 
prefer Illinois' decision to enforce, though it is certainly something 
about which reasonable persons could disagree. But the point is that 
once Michigan's lawmakers disagree, the question of a better law be-
comes meaningless: we begin the choice of law analysis from the 
premise that states are coequal sovereigns, entitled to make different 
judgments. True conflicts present competing but equally legitimate 
versions of what is just in a particular case, and each state - by defini-
tion - has an equal claim to have its law applied, its policy imple-
mented, and its version of the just result vindicated. 
Perhaps there is an intermediate position. Conceptually, at least, it 
seems plausible to say that one state's contacts with a case can give 
that state a stronger claim to apply its law - that while the other 
state's contacts may be sufficient to create an interest, they are more 
tangential. On this view, the state with the stronger contacts is the 
more authoritative lawmaker in this case. Such an approach probably 
coincides with the intuitions of many readers and may explain the 
popularity of the Second Restatement. But it still assumes an objective 
measure of the relative strength of each state's claim to apply its law, 
and there simply is no such measure - or rather there are fifty such 
measures, each equally valid for these purposes. So if Illinois consid-
ers the domicile of the party seeking enforcement critical, while Michi-
gan says to apply the law of the place where the contract was made, 
we have no external point of reference from which to judge one state 
right and the other wrong. The states have simply made different de-
terminations about when they want to exercise legislative jurisdiction. 
It does not follow that any solution is necessarily arbitrary. But 
we need to change the way we think about the problem and recognize 
that "right" answer in this context means something different, some-
thing subjective. Because states are equally authoritative in making 
i.-ules for multistate cases, the only "right" answer is one the interested 
states agree mutually to adopt. Just as each state is free to decide 
whether to permit or prohibit contracts to make a will in the first 
place, each is free to decide what contacts with the state trigger that 
2144 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:2134 
law's applicability. Accordingly, if the states agree to apply a particu-
lar law in particular situations, their agreement makes that the "right" 
answer for those cases. 23 
Developing such agreement may be difficult. Why should either 
state agree to apply the other state's law instead of its own? Applying 
another state's law means sacrificing the substantive policy of your 
own. If Michigan law is applied, Michigan policy is implemented -
and Illinois policy is not. Why should Illinois agree to this instead of 
holding out for the application of Illinois law? Put another way, since 
the choice in any true conflict appears to be zero-sum, how are states 
to decide whose law should yield?24 
The flaw in this reasoning is the assumption that choice of law is 
zero sum. To be sure, in any particular case, applying one state's law 
necessarily means not applying the other's. But the policies at stake 
may not be equally important to both states. Each state presumably 
cares more about some true conflicts than others, because some true 
conflicts affect more important purposes of the state's laws or affect 
these purposes in more important ways. Moreover, because the states' 
substantive policies are different, it is unlikely that their preferences in 
this regard are identical. Choice of law is thus a variable-sum game in 
which some solutions may leave states better off than others by calling 
for the application of their laws in more of the cases they care about. 
This understanding, in turn, suggests a way to think about secur-
ing agreement on multistate choice of law problems. It is impossible 
for all states to implement their policies in true conflict cases: one 
state's law will not be applied in each case, frustrating that state's pol-
icy at least to that extent. We can, however, look for solutions that 
23. Alternatively a choice of law solution could be imposed on the states by a superior au· 
thority - in this case Congress, which is expressly empowered to enact such a law by the full 
faith and credit clause. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. Michael Gottesman recently made n 
powerful argument for such a solution, which has a number of obvious advantages (not the least 
of which is that it could be implemented across the nation immediately). Gottesman, Draining 
the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (forthcoming 
October, 1991). Nonetheless, a solution that originates in the states seems preferable for seveml 
reasons. First, getting choice of law onto the national agenda in Congress is unrealistic. Second, 
a choice of law scheme that originates in and is agreed to by the states is likely to be better 
because the problem itself concerns the scope of state laws. In this regard, it is worth remember· 
ing that one of the aims of the NCCUSL was to minimire federal intrusion into state law matters 
by providing states a collective voice on questions requiring coordination. Dunham, A History of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS. 
233, 237 (1965). 
24. Cf. B. CuRRIE, supra note 13, at 169: 
There remains the stubborn fact that under any conceivable conflict-of-laws method the 
interests of one state will be sacrificed to those of another whenever there is a conflict. The 
only virtue of the method proposed here [to apply forum law] is that it at least makes the 
choice of interests on a rational and objective basis: the forum consistently applies its own 
law in case of conflict, and thus at least advances its domestic policy. 
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enhance the likelihood that each state's law is applied in the cases it 
cares about most. That way, even if no state fully realizes its objec-
tives, all states can at least maximize the extent to which they imple-
ment their policies. 
The success of such an approach requires states to cooperate with 
one another. To maximize state policies, we must determine which 
cases states care about and arrange tradeoffs to secure the application 
of each state's law in as many of these as possible. Because true con-
flict cases are litigated in different courts, however, all states must en-
force the tradeoffs so defined, directing their courts to apply foreign 
law in appropriate cases. Only by thus making choice of law turn on 
actual policy preferences rather than where suit is brought can we suc-
cessfully maximize state policies. 
With this analysis, we are at last in a position to understand why 
rules are necessary to produce the best substantive results in choice of 
law. First, while it seems theoretically possible to run such an ap-
proach case-by-case - requiring the court to apply the law of the state 
with the stronger policy commitment in the particular case25 - in 
practice such determinations are so subjective and complex as virtu-
ally to guarantee arbitrariness.26 Maximizing the interests of different 
states can be done only on a more wholesale basis: by identifying gen-
erally shared policies or policy preferences and constructing rules that 
systematically advance these.21 
Second, and more important, to cooperate successfully states must 
be able to coordinate the handling of cases in their own courts and to 
monitor compliance by courts in other states. As noted above, defer-
ring to foreign law in appropriate cases makes sense only if other states 
follow suit, for only then is a state's forbearance from applying its own 
law repaid by the reciprocal forbearance of others. This, in turn, re-
quires both internal coordination and external monitoring to ensure 
consistent treatment by judicial bureaucracies in each state, and that 
can be done effectively on1iY with a system of rules. 28 
The argument is thus that rules provide the most effective mecha-
nism for implementing a system of tradeoffs that will maximize the 
interests of all states. Such a system, in turn, can provide a framework 
25. This essentially is Baxter's proposal for resolving true conflicts by "comparative impair-
ment" analysis. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963). 
26. This is borne out by the experience of courts attempting to apply comparative impair-
ment analysis. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 315-18 & n.135. 
27. For a more detailed analysis of how such rules work, including illustrations, see id. at 
319-38; Kramer, More Notes, supra note 20. 
28. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 339-44; Kramer, supra note 19. 
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for building a consensus about handling choice of law. Hence, the best 
way to "solve" the choice of law problem is to develop a system of 
rules that states will agree to follow. 
Ill. ON THE NEED FOR ACTION BY THE NCCUSL 
Not any system of rules will do, of course. We need rules that 
actually maximize state interests in true conflicts, something that most 
definitely will be difficult to achieve. We must articulate and reduce to 
workable formulations a great many complex tradeoffs. Moreover, the 
true conflict "pie" can be divided along any number of axes: by shared 
substantive preferences, by the relative emergence or obsolescence of 
particular policies, by how policies fit within or across state systems, 
by the states' ordering of policies in wholly domestic cases, and proba-
bly in numerous other ways as well. The question, then, is how best to 
work out the specific terms of acceptable choice of law rules. 
One possibility is to leave the courts to develop rules through com-
mon law adjudication. This has the advantage of allowing for trial 
and error. Courts can experiment with rules - developing and testing 
alternatives for different situations, writing opinions that explain why 
a particular rule seems beneficial, responding to perceived defects in 
other courts' rules. Given the newness of this approach to choice of 
law, and the difficulty of making the required determinations, this pro-
cess could be extremely beneficial. Eventually, a consensus will 
emerge, gathering momentum as more states begin using the same 
rules. 
There are, however, significant obstacles to developing a complete 
system of rules through common law adjudication.29 It is always diffi-
cult to coordinate decisionmaking in a large, decentralized system. If 
trial and error leads different courts to strike out in different direc-
tions, getting them to settle on a uniform practice is likely to prove 
difficult. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that optimal trade-
offs may require linking issues across categories. Because issue linkage 
vastly increases the number of potential rules, there is likely to be con-
siderable disagreement and confusion about which formulations are 
best. Finally, maximizing state interests and building cooperation re-
quires rules that cover a wide spectrum of conflicts disputes. Adopt-
ing a particular rule or subset of rules may not be in a state's interests 
unless rules in some other area provide offsetting benefits. Yet courts 
develop solutions on a piecemeal basis - case by case, problem by 
29. See L. BRILMAYER, supra note 14, at 182-83. 
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problem. AB a result, getting the system going may be terribly 
difficult. 
While these obstacles are indeed formidable, I have explained else-
where why it is nonetheless plausible to believe that over time judges 
could develop workable choice of law rules that resemble a sort of 
constructive multistate compact. 30 The long tenure of the traditional 
rules evidences this possibility, as does the uniformity of common and 
customary law in many areas of domestic and intemational law.31 At 
best, however, developing a comprehensive system of choice of law 
rules through adjudication will be extremely slow, and a lot of time 
and resources will be wasted in the meantime. 
For this reason, it makes more sense to promulgate a choice of law 
code outside the context of decisional law. While this limits the op-
portunity to experiment with different proposals, such a code avoids 
the problems discussed above. A centralized decisionmaking body can 
consider a wide array of problems simultaneously, make necessary or 
appropriate issue linkages, and produce a complete system of rules. 
States may then sign onto this system, diminishing the rune it would 
otherwise take to reach a consensus and greatly increasing the chances 
of success. To further facilitate this process, each state's use of such a 
code could be made contingent on reciprocity from other states. 
States adopting the code would follow it only in conflicts with other 
states that do the same; otherwise, the state would simply apply its 
own law. This would prevent free riding and heighten the pressure to 
cooperate. 32 · 
The only remaining problem is to find an institution with the nec-
essary authority and resources. I have already indicated why I think a 
federal solution is unlikely and may be less desirable than a solution 
that originates in the states. 33 Most choice of law scholars assume that 
the ideal body to resolve choice of law problems is the American Law 
Institute, which has provided the twentieth century's most widely used 
approaches to choice of law. As Lea Brilmayer recently explained in 
discussing the possibility of developing a Restatement (Third) of Con-
flict of Laws: 
The Restatements enjoy numerous advantages in setting out coopera-
tive conflict of law solutions. First, because the Restatements are com-
prehensive documents, they can cover a broad enough range of topics to 
link issues on which some states stand to benefit with issues on which the 
30. See Kramer, supra note 16, at 343-44; Kramer, supra note 19. 
31. See Kramer, supra note 19. 
32. See id. 
33. See supra note 23. 
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others do. Also because they are comprehensive, they can be drafted to 
cover a wide enough range of contingencies to give clear guidance. 
Courts should not have to guess too often about how cases ought to be 
decided because the goal is cooperative behavior, and coordination is not 
possible if the instructions are too vague. Third, the membership of the 
American Law Institute is drawn from all over the country and does not 
owe allegiance to a particular state or region. As a less political body 
than a typical state legislature, its solutions should reflect the interests of 
the multistate system as a whole and be perceived as relatively neutral.34 
These same advantages apply to uniform laws adopted under the 
auspices of the NCCUSL. Moreover, uniform laws are superior to the 
Restatements in a number of important respects. First, the member-
ship of the National Conference consists of official appointees from all 
fifty states and is thus ideally suited to negotiate the concessions states 
must make to one another.35 Second, because uniform laws are posi-
tively enacted by state legislatures, they may acquire greater authority 
and prove more durable than a Restatement.36 
The most important advantage of a uniform law over a Restate-
ment, however, derives from a limitation inherent in the whole Re-
statement project. The function of a Restatement is just that: to 
restate the law, to identify "as nearly as may be the rules which our 
courts will apply today."37 To be sure, the ALI has a well-deserved 
reputation for stretching the precedents to reform and improve the 
law.38 But the drafters of a Restatement are nonetheless bound to a 
considerable degree by existing decisions. 39 
34. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 14, at 185 (footnote omitted). Brilmayer herself does not 
appear to favor a Restatement to the exclusion of other forms of choice of law codes; she is 
concerned that some such solution be developed. 
35. This distinguishes work produced by the NCCUSL from the ALi's "model laws," which 
are otherwise similar to uniform laws. 
36. Cf. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 14, at 182 (legislative solutions are likely to be more stable 
than judicial solutions). It is, of course, possible to codify a Restatement, but this is contrary to 
the purpose of the Restatement project. In the words of the ALi's first director, "there never has 
been any desire to give [the Restatements] statutory authority," for they are "designed to help 
preserve not to change the common system of expressing law and adapting it to changing condi-
tions in a changing world." Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restate-
ment of the Law: ''How We Did It," in RFsrATEMENT IN THE CoURTS 19 (permanent ed. 1945). 
37. Lewis, supra note 36, at 19; see also L. F'RmDMAN, A HlsrORY OP AMERICAN LAW 582 
(1973); Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, IS IOWA L. 
REV. 19, 21-22 (1929); Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 
283, 286. 
38. See Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 149-51 (1969). 
39. As Wechsler points out, the ALI has in recent years been much more open about using 
Restatements to reform the law. Id. Nevertheless, the limits imposed by existing precedent re-
main severe. For example, Wechsler cites the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to illus-
trate the new reformist approach to restating the law. In my second year of teaching, I attended 
an annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools held in Miami. The conflicts 
section met in tribute to Willis Reese, reporter for the Restatement (Second). The occasion 
notwithstanding, a number of participants could not resist criticizing Reese for having retained 
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This is a real disadvantage in drafting a choice of law code. Ex-
isting decisions on choice of law are products of a long tradition of 
confused and misguided thinking, and results in many areas are 
plainly colored by the conceptual abstrusities that have befuddled (and 
continue to befuddle) analysis in this field. Some of these solutions 
may ultimately prove useful, but clearly it is better if the drafters of a 
code can freely abandon authority and strike out in new directions 
where appropriate. This is a freedom enjoyed by the drafters of a uni-
form law but not a Restatement. 
CONCLUSION 
Choice of law is an important practical as well as theoretical prob-
lem. We need a sensible, workable conflicts doctrine to facilitate inter-
state and international dealings. More generally, we need acceptable 
solutions to choice of law problems to minimize conflict at the edges, 
where competing legal systems collide. 
I have tried to explain why the best approach to choice of law will 
take the form of a comprehensive system of rules. On the one hand, 
the conventional argument for rules - that they facilitate uniform, 
predictable results - remains persuasive and powerful in this context, 
particularly in light of recent experience with case-by-case choice of 
law analysis. On the other hand, I have tried to show that the very 
nature of choice of law is such that a system of reciprocally applied 
rules is,most likely to ensure the best substantive outcomes. · 
All we need are the rules. Here, the NCCUSL can play an impor-
tant role by investing its resources and its reputation into developing 
and promoting a comprehensive choice of law code. If drafted well, 
such a code should prove quite popular, because no one is happy with 
the current state of affairs. As with the Uniform Commercial Code, 
getting the new law adopted in a few important states - New York, 
California, Florida, Texas - may create enough momentum to per-
suade other states to go along. In any event, the first step is to develop 
the code, and that will require effort enough for the moment. 
so many rules from the First Restatement. Reese responded that he wanted to abandon these but 
that there were limits to what one could do in a Restatement because one had to work within the 
existing decisions. 
For what it is worth, the new Restatements may involve less a departure from prior practice 
than simply a willingness to be open about it. See Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Per-
spective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & Hlsr. REv. 55 (1990) (suggesting 
that the early rhetoric about "telling judges what the law is" was a deliberate cover for a self-
consciously reformist program). 
